Abstract. In this paper, we provide a theoretical foundation for and improvements to the existing bytecode verification technology, a critical component of the Java security model, for mobile code used with the Java "micro edition" (J2ME), which is intended for embedded computing devices. In Java, remotely loaded "bytecode" class files are required to be bytecode verified before execution, that is, to undergo a static type analysis that protects the platform's Java run-time system from socalled type confusion attacks such as pointer manipulation. The data flow analysis that performs the verification, however, is beyond the capacity of most embedded devices because of the memory requirements that the typical algorithm will need. We propose to take a proof-carrying code approach to data flow analysis in defining an alternative technique called "lightweight analysis" that uses the notion of a "certificate" to reanalyze a previously analyzed data flow problem, even on poorly resourced platforms. We formally prove that the technique provides the same guarantees as standard bytecode safety verification analysis, in particular that it is "tamper proof" in the sense that the guarantees provided by the analysis cannot be broken by crafting a "false" certificate or by altering the analyzed code. We show how the Java bytecode verifier fits into this framework for an important subset of the Java Virtual Machine; we also show how the resulting "lightweight bytecode verification" technique generalizes and simulates the J2ME verifier (to be expected as Sun's J2ME "K-Virtual machine" verifier was directly based on an early version of this work), as well as Leroy's "on-card bytecode verifier," which is specifically targeted for Java Cards.
Introduction
In this section we present the context of lightweight bytecode verification. Specifically, we advocate for our approach to Java bytecode type safety verification. Finally, we give an overview of the paper.
MOBILE CODE ON SMALL DEVICES
Over the past years, there has been an increasing demand for generalizing the programming capability of small, independent network-connected devices such as smart cards, point-of-sale terminals, personal digital assistants, set-top boxes, and other types of pervasive devices that feature an on-device microprocessor.
In this paper, we specifically consider how to ensure type safety for code that is downloaded over an untrusted network onto such a small device. The Java platform seems ideally suited for this task because Java and its predecessor Oak originally were developed with this type of deployment in mind (Sun, 1997; O'Connell, 1995) . The original Oak prototype did, in fact, already include a bytecode verifier that locally ensured the well-typedness of transmitted code. For various reasons, the prototype failed in performance, but the idea survived in terms of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). At the virtual machine level it is possible to address both safety and security issues independently of both the underlying execution platform and an untrusted code provider. Indeed, the initial success of Java was associated with the ability to send mobile code as "applets" over an untrusted network to be executed in a Web browser in a secure manner. The technique that allows this is called "sandboxing" (Sun, 2002) . A cornerstone of the sandboxing security model is type safety, which basically guarantees that all object references truly refer to objects of a compatible type. Type safety is crucial because so-called type confusion attacks may seriously alter a system's security measures, for example, by updating an object at an address manufactured in an integer (for a survey of Java security attacks see McGraw and Felten, 1997) .
In Figure 1 we show how bytecode verification normally has been sceduled for a Java class file transfer over an untrusted network.
Today, the Java 2 standard is organized into a variety of different platforms. One of these, the Java 2 Micro Edition (J2ME), is specifically targeted for small devices featuring an on-device microprocessor (Sun, 1999a) . The smallest of such devices are described by the Connected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC) specification (Taivalsaari, 2000) . To give an idea of the available memory on such a device, we consider a Java Card (Sun, 1999b) platform that implements the CLDC (Chen, 2000) . 
Scratch memory:
General name for the part of the RAM that has the highest flexibility and permits full-speed read and write operations of individual bytes. The contents, however, are lost when the power is removed. Scratch memory is quite expensive. This kind of memory is typically available in the range of a few thousand bytes on a smart card.
Flash memory: Persistent memory that can be read bytewise but written to only in blocks of continuous bytes (typically 64) by a process that is rather slow (typically 10,000 times slower than for scratch memory). Flash memory is relatively inexpensive. This type of memory typically comes in the range of thirty to a hundred thousand bytes on a smart card.
ROM: Read-Only Memory, which becomes fixed when the circuit is manufactured. Earlier smart card editions typically contained 16,000 bytes of ROM for completely constant system programs and data. ROM is becoming increasingly obsolete because of decreasing costs of Flash memory (so even system data can now be updated).
When the present study began, it was not obvious how to provide for bytecode type safety on such sparsely resourced execution platforms. Sun's original bytecode verifier was specified as a data flow algorithm with a space requirement proportional to the number of backward jumps in the bytecode. (To be specific, the data flow algorithm could be implemented with a space requirement given by O(B * (S + L)), where B is the number of backward jump targets, S is the maximal stack size, and L is the number of local variables (Lindholm and Yellin, 1996, §4.9) .) For many small devices, however, this space requirement is beyond their capacity. The traditional way to overcome this has been to "sign" the bytecode with a digital signature and then check the authenticity of this at the device (Sun, 2002) .
When we began this study, a different approach to prevent safety violations for code transmitted over an untrusted network had just been published: proof-carrying code (Necula, 1997; Necula and Lee, 1996) . However, it was for a long time unclear how the approach specifically could be applied to Java and why there should be a need, when bytecode could be secured from attacks by means of digital signatures.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURES
Code signing can be done by using symmetric, shared-key cryptography or by using public-key signatures. (Smart card standards such as "Global Platform" support both types of key signatures on Java Card applets.) All techniques that implement this concept, however, work by storing a "key" from a trusted party by which the authenticity of the code signature eventually is checked at the execution platform.
We have listed some issues concerning cryptographic signatures.
-A well-established technology already exists for many smart card standards (Sun, 2002 ). -Cryptographic signatures guarantee that the code is literally identical to the code that was sent off by the trusted party. -The code consumer, however, is obliged to trust an external party (the key provider). -The number of keys to store has a tendency to grow, which may be problematic on very sparsely resourced devices (Anderson, 1994 ). -The trust-relation between code consumer and code provider creates a single point of failure system. Whenever a device receives code that is widely distributed, it is an unfortunate situation when the device producer and the code provider do not necessarily trust the same sources (or each other). In banking, for example, this is the frequent case when credit cards are issued by one bank whereas code is produced and encrypted by a competing bank (Anderson, 1994) .
For systems or devices that are storing high-sensitive data (credit cards, banking cards, personal identification devices, etc.), the last three of the listed arguments are even more problematic to overcome than for other constrained systems because of the devastating perspective of a safety or security leak.
PROOF-CARRYING CODE
The concept of proof-carrying code (PCC) was launched by Necula and Lee (1996) . It allows untrusted code to be statically verified as safe to execute, in the case where safe code behavior can be logically specified as type properties and automatically verified. PCC works by the definition of a "security policy" expressed as a logical system of decidable program safety properties. Thus, for a correct program, an additional proof with respect to the defined logical system can be constructed on code transfer time such that it can be mechanically decided whether the program adheres to the adopted policy at the code receiving platform. (We refer to Section 1.4 for further discussion of the definition of PCC.)
We have listed some issues concerning PCC.
-The code consumer has to trust only its own, internal security policy management. -The checker component implements a decidable proof check at the code receiving platform. -Application of PCC (security policy, proof generator, and mechanical proof checker) for different kinds of compiler schemas to real assembler code have already been successfully implemented (Colby et al., 2000b; Necula and Lee, 1996) .
By the term safe program behavior, we understand behavior that does not allow access to private files/data, to overwrite important files/data, to access unauthorized resources, etc.
-The number of transfered bytes will increase with the size of the certificate. -PCC methods can ensure only that the code doesn't alter the code consumer's security policy. It cannot ensure that the received code is the same as the emitted code. -It is crucial that the proof producer and the code consumer have integrated the same safety policy in order for a correct program to be accepted. Thus, if the code emitter sends an accompanying proof based on a different (noncompatible) safety policy, the code will not get accepted, even in those cases where the program is safe to execute.
For systems or devices that are storing high-sensitive data (credit cards, banking cards, personal identification devices, etc.) in particular, the first of the listed arguments that credits PCC is highly attractive. The fact that a code receiver has to trust only its own, internal safety policy makes the system very robust for attacks. The main disadvantage to overcome is how to deal with the increased size of transmitted bytes, as well as the proof (type) checker's size and the memory consumption on the code receiving platform.
Also important is whether it is critical that the received code, even when proven safe to execute, may have been altered along the network in some (safe) manner.
APPLICATION OF PCC FOR JAVA
Earlier work, dating to year 2000, has successfully addressed this issue for a compiler of Java source code to X86 (Intel) assembly code (Colby et al., 2000b (Colby et al., , 2000a . The certifying Java compiler in this case produces the native target code, annotations, and a proof with respect to a set of axioms and rules that specifies the Java type safety requirements for the Intel architecture.
In this study, however, we have been concerned with a description of a platformindependent application of PCC to object-oriented languages in general, and Java in particular, in order for our solution to scale well.
When this work began in 1997 and 1998 (Rose, 1997; Rose and Rose, 1998) , the notion of PCC was defined in a more restricted manner than it is today (Necula, 1997) . At the time, PCC had been specifically defined for proof systems with respect to a well-founded logic with a Curry-Howard isomorphism to the transmitted language's formal type system.
The definition at the time made a direct application of PCC for Java impossible, because no well-founded formal logic had yet been specified for object systems with subtyping.
With the altered definition of PCC in 2000, however, our original approach to lightweight bytecode verification (Rose and Rose, 1998) , where Java bytecode safety was decided by an axiomatic system for the Java virtual machine's static, operational semantics, now comes under the definition of PCC listing of issues for PCC in Section 1.3 is valid for both the original and later specification of (The PCC.) 1.5. OUR APPROACH By taking a proof-carrying code approach to bytecode verification over an untrusted network, we assume that the type safety process is performed in several steps: at the code transmitter platform, which we assume is large enough to host a certifying bytecode verifier, and at the code receiver platform, which we assume is very constrained in memory space. As a result of this approach, type safety verification becomes divided into several stages as illustrated in Figure 2 .
We intend to formalize the lightweight bytecode verification in two steps: first we specify lightweight bytecode verification as a general data flow problem; then we specifically apply the problem to the Java virtual machine. In both cases, we shall formalize the technique as an inference system.
OVERVIEW
In Section 2 we formally specify lightweight bytecode verification in a data flow framework. Specifically, we address when a (constraint-based) data flow problem can be converted into a lightweight data flow problem, and we show that the technique is "tamper proof." In Section 3 we apply lightweight verification to Java (bytecode) for an important Java virtual machine subset. In Section 4 we specifically relate lightweight verification for Java to Sun's J2ME bytecode verifier and Leroy's Java on-card verifier. Finally, in Section 5, we draw conclusions about the work. 
The Lightweight Data Flow Concept
In this section, we present the theory of "lightweight verification" as a way to solve a data flow problem. We do so in accordance with the way data flow analysis is presented by Nielson et al. (1999) .
DATA FLOW ANALYSIS
We shall take a constraint-based approach to data flow analysis and represent programs as directed graphs where nodes are given in terms of labeled "elementary blocks" connected by control flow edges. (Any traditional flow graph organized in basic blocks is an example of such a graph; the simplest way to obtain a labeling of basic blocks is to use the entry address of the blocks as the flow graph's label set.) EXAMPLE 1 (Java source). Consider a Java source program for a method m() as shown in Figure 3 . Flow analysis of m() will determine that x has either the type assignment x : t = A or x : t = B. (This is consistent with the declared type B, but the declared type of local variables is not maintained until run time, so this has no significance for verification.) Subsequently the method call x.dummy() is safe as it just requires t ≤: B, that is, that t is a subtype of (or the same as) B, which is true for both type assignments. DEFINITION 2 (Data flow graphs, problems and their solutions). Let Lab be the nonempty set of labels that denotes the basic blocks of a program in a unique way. Let State be the associated domain of program analysis state, and let it be partially ordered such that State, is a well-founded semi-lattice with as its pointed element.
A data flow graph for a program or code is formally specified by a total map exits that to a labeled basic block associates a set of directed edges to other (labeled) basic blocks.
If an edge is defined, starting from a node , we say that is an exiting node in the graph. To each exiting node we can associate at least one partial state-transformation map τ : State → State in the following manner
When τ is well defined for some (entry) state s ∈ State for an exiting node to , we say that s is a valid state for τ on , and write τ, ∈ exits( ). Edges impose data flow constraints in a graph. If s is a valid state for all transformers τ on and s is a valid state for all transformers on , then the constraint contribution from the edge to is given by
A data flow problem is concerned with whether there exists a set of valid entry states for all transformers and nodes such that the graph's constraint set is satisfied. A solution is specified by a total map entry: Lab → State, where
We say that exits is solvable iff there is a map entry such that (2a) is satisfied.
To ease our formalizations, we introduce two synthetic nodes init and ret . We tacitly extend the definition of exits to the extended domain
is the default transformer on init such that the only exit is τ init , 0 ∈ exits( init ), and -ret per default is not an exiting node, i.e., exits( ret ) = ∅.
By abuse of notation, we will let Lab denote the extended domain.
Notice the two ways a candidate entry can fail as a solution: when there is an edge τ, ∈ exits( ) for some , ∈ Lab for which either the candidate entry( ) is not a valid state for τ or the flow constraint (2a) isn't satisfied. EXAMPLE 3 (Java bytecode). In Figure 4 we have listed the virtual machine bytecode as a sequence of basic blocks (separated by blanks in the figure) that are annotated with their relative bytecode address. Except for a few clarifying simplifications, the code has been generated by a standard Java compiler when applied to the program in Example 1. The Lab set consists of the relative entry addresses for the three basic blocks, namely, 0, 11, 19, as well as init and ret.
The purpose of Java bytecode verification is to analyze the type of data that a method can process. A "state" description becomes a (static) type description of a Java method frame, that is, a (static) type description of the method's operand stack and local variable Our State set for this method consequently consists of type descriptions of a stack with at most one element, and a local variable table with at most two elements (in the JVM the first element always contains the this reference for instance methods). The state represented by type triples t stack , t this , t x . The type of the stack, t stack is a stack of the types on the stack; we shall need for the empty stack and stacks with a single type in this example. For the local variables, t this and t x , ⊥ denotes that the value might not have been initialized.
The example has an initial jump to block 0 and a final jump to ret and constraints from the three edges, one to 11 and two directed to the basic block at address 19.
where the "(entry( ))[t x → t ]" denotes the state obtained from entry( ) by overriding the type of the local variable for x with t , and "entry(i)\ft" means overriding entry(i) with frame type state ft.
Once we have defined the approximation relation on the frame type states, we can solve these constraints. For Java it turns out (details in the following section) that is derived from the Java assignment compatibility type rules by pointwise extension from the frame type constituents (stack elements and variable types). The constraint system can then be solved by setting
LIGHTWEIGHT DATA FLOW ANALYSIS
In general we have that the determination of an entry solution requires a generic data flow analysis (Kildall, 1973) . With lightweight analysis we suggest that a flow graph can be reanalyzed in a single traversal of its nodes in ascending order based on an appropriate label annotations, a "certificate," collected during a prior proper analysis. By assuming an order on the nodes, it is possible to separate those constraints that are forward directed and therefore can be incorporated directly in the "reconstruction" of a solution, and the "backward"-directed constraints, which cannot be reconstructed but still need to be checked against the candidate. To formalize this idea, we shall assume the graph nodes are totally ordered and that the states are comparable. DEFINITION 4 (Lightweight hypothesis). We consider a connected and directed flow graph where (Lab, ≤) is a finite, total order, and (4a) (State, ) is a well-founded semi-lattice (4b)
We denote the pointed element by ∈ State and the "meet" or "lub" operator by : State × State → State. Notice that is both total, commutative, and associative over a well-founded semi-lattice structure. The property implies that there exist a unique "meet" transformer over any edge i to j , given by
Let N ∈ N be the number of elements in the finite, partially ordered set Lab. We can index the nodes, in ascending order, by N consecutive, ascending natural numbers starting at (−1)
. We notice that (−1) corresponds to init , and (N+2) corresponds to ret in the framework of Definition 2.
Remark 5. We have that (4b) is consistent with general data flow analysis requirements (Kildall, 1973) . As pointed out by Klein and Nipkow (2002) , requirement (4b) is equally sufficient to ensure that lightweight verification performs a correct type safety analysis on Java bytecode.
The idea of lightweight bytecode verification is to perform a single pass of the flow graph in ascending node order, and for each node check that the constraints imposed by flow edges in both directions are satisfied with respect to a candidate solution. With respect to the forward edges in the graph, we need to maintain a structure of "pending" constraint checks (to be checked when we reach the target of the edge); similarly for the backward edges, we need to maintain a structure of the solution candidate states, which are "saved" to be checked later.
Such an approach has two problems: Figure 5 . Lightweight analysis data structures.
-During the linear pass we cannot know whether a label is the target of a backwards jump from some block to be processed later. We suggest that these "backward labels" are provided externally, to notify the algorithm of when to save a program state. -We have to determine a solution candidate value when a data flow analysis iteration, resulting in another pass of the flow graph, would otherwise be inevitable. We suggest the correct entry program state information it provided externally for these "iteration nodes" (i.e., program states that satisfy the program's constraint set).
The external provision is formalized in terms of a certificate:
DEFINITION 6 (A lightweight certificate). Let exits: Lab → Edge * define a data flow graph. A certificate is given by a pair of a state map and label set
We define sc as a total map with the intent that sc( ) = when no backward constraints to are imposed by the flow graph.
In Figure 5 , we have illustrated, in a semiformal way, the changes to the "pending" (P ) and "saved" (S) data structures for the three possible flow situations a node can be involved in. (We tacitly assume the mentioned convention that P ( ) = if there are no pending constraints registered for , and S( ) = ⊥ if there are no saved constraints registered for .)
The flow edges, given as arrows, are annotated with their formal name. The nodes, labeled by − ≤ ≤ + , are annotated with the kind of action that lightweight analysis requires during the ascending node traversal. We write "M[x → v]" to denote the map obtained from M by overriding the map of x to yield the value v.
We explain the three situations the lightweight algorithm must handle, in accordance with Figure 5 .
-At − : a forward directed edge to is discovered from the node labeled with − . The contribution from this edge to the "pending" constraint P at is formally specified as τ − (sc( − ) P ( − )). At this point, P becomes updated at with all the previously accumulated, pending constraints, namely, P ( ), and the specified contribution from the edge comming from the node at − . -At : at this point, the current solution at consists of all previously accumulated, pending constraints, specified by P ( ), as well as of the constraint imposed by the certificate, namely, sc( ). We note that the current solution satisfies all forward directed flow constraints. The node at is also a target for a backward directed flow constraint. At this point, the current state is saved in S for a later constraint check. -At + : a backward directed edge to is discovered. At this point, the saved constraint S( ) and constraint imposed from the node at + , namely,
, are checked for type safety.
S and P are formalized as simple maps.
DEFINITION 7 (Saved and pending). Let exists: Lab → Edge * be a data flow graph. "Saved" and "pending" are specified as total maps
with the intent that S( ) = whenever is not a backward target, and P ( ) = whenever is not a forward target. EXAMPLE 8 (Java lightweight bytecode verification). Reconsider the Java bytecode in Figure 4 from Example 3. The code is organized in three basic blocks with two forward jumps (from the block at address 0 to 19, and from the block at address 11 to 19) and one backward jump (from the block at address 19 to 11). We shall illustrate how the lightweight verifier updates S and P according to the description in Figure 5 with a lightweight certificate given as follows:
The exit maps are defined by the labeled frame type transformers τ . These are defined over each basic block according to the Java instruction semantics (Lindholm and Yellin, 1999) . The arguments are the entry states for the blocks. To indicate that there are no requirements on a type, we write "_".
We have listed the P and S updates in the order the blocks are being visited. 
where
When there exists a certificate ce such that exits, ce we say exits is lightweight verifiable.
The lightweight verification rules are specified as a (tail) recursive rule set over the label domain. where exits, ce , P , S reads as follows: the subgraph with node labels greater than or equal to lightweight analyzes in a flow graph context of constraints exits, and of the certificate ce, with the forward constraint set P and the backward constraint set S.
exits, ce
, P , S (10a) where = max(Dom(exits))
exits, ce , P , S → P , S exits, ce , P , S exits, ce , P , S
where < max(Dom(exits)) ∧ = min{ ∈ Dom(exits | > }
The lightweight analysis of a node reflects the scenarios for node in Figure 5 , that is, whether a node is involved in forward or backward directed constraints. 
To prove the equivalence between lightweight analysis and standard analysis, we begin by stating an important invariant property.
DEFINITION 12 (Lightweight invariant). Let exits: Lab → Edge
* define a data flow graph which complies with the lightweight hypothesis. We have that iff there is a solution exits, and a certificate ce such that exits, ce lightweight verifies up to node k , then the following invariants hold
We proceed by the formulation and proof of our main result.
THEOREM 13 (Lightweight bytecode verification equivalence). Given a data flow graph, exits: Lab → Edge * , which comply with the lightweight hypothesis, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) exits is solvable (cf. Definition 2).
(2) exits is lightweight verifiable (cf. Definition 9).
Proof. The proof is given by co-induction over the exits label domain. The proof strategy is the usual one for co-induction over a finite, well-founded set, with the induction hypothesis, for (−1) ≤ k ≤ (|Dom(exits)| − 2), given by
The equivalence between statement (1) and (2) is shown in two steps (cases).
Assumption: Case (1) ⇒ (2): Hypothesis Hyp(k) holds, and exits is solvable.
Case (2) ⇒ (1): Hypothesis Hyp(k) holds, and exits is lightweight verifiable.
Co-induction step: Show Hyp(k) ⇒ Hyp(k + 1).
Final case: Show Hyp(|Dom(exits)| − 2).
Co-induction step for case (2) ⇒ (1). With (k + 1) < (|Dom(exits)| − 2), Definition 10 unfolds the conclusion as follows. where
), and entry( k+1 ) τ (k+1)(k+1) (entry( k+1 )). Follows from (13c), (13d), and H2(k + 1). Co-induction step for case (1) ⇒ (2). With (k + 1) < (|Dom(exits)| − 2)
• H2(k + 1), H3(k + 1) holds with the same arguments as in (2) ⇒ (1) because exits is solvable, provided that ∀ j , j < (k + 1) : j ∈ Lc iff j is a backward target.
• H4(k + 1) holds because P k+2 is given as the set of all forward jumps. Notice we can choose a state-map sc such that sc
where entry( i ) ❁ P k ( i ).
• H5(k + 1) holds because of H3(k) and because exits is solvable.
The final case, Hyp(|Dom(exits)| − 2), follows trivially from the fact that |Dom(exits)|−2 is the (syntetic) return node. ✷
The proof also gave us a "strategy" for how to design a certificate. The construction of the label set: ∀ ∈ Lab : ∈ Lc iff is a backward target. The construction of the state-map: choose sc such that sc( ) = entry( ) for all ∈ Lab where entry( ) ❁ P ( ).
Finally, we investigate the space complexity of the type check algorithm suggested by the proof (and explained in Figure 5) , based on the current Lightweight Verification strategy.
MEMORY ANALYSIS
A program and its lightweight certificate can be placed in any sort of "slow write" memory on the target platform (flash, EPROM, or EEPROM), since they need to be written only once. From here on we denote this memory simply as "Flash."
The maximal scratch space we require to perform a lightweight bytecode verification of a (connected) graph in one traversal of its nodes is decided by the maximal byte-size of a program state and the number of backward or forward edges in the graph. The number of backward labels indicates how many states will be stored in the "saved" contraint structure, whereas "pending" specifies the maximal number of simultaneously active (i.e., overlapping) forward edges in the flow graph. The reason why we specifically consider "overlapping" forward edges is that nodes for which there is a forward edge clearly will not be scanned again if the node and its target have already been scanned. This means that the "pending" constraint structure well may be garbage collected during lightweight bytecode verification.
We summarize the discussion by the following equation:
where #state is the (maksimal) size of a state, Lc is the number of backward labels, and #P is the greatest number of simultaneously (or overlapping) forward edges during the flow graph traversal. In Table I , we have listed some interesting memory tradeoffs for a flow graph with a certificate given by sc, Lc .
We notice that all graphs are connected, #P ≥ 1. Depending on the number of jumps and the amount of certificate reuse, we have the following. 
COROLLARY 15 (Scratch memory requirements). The number of states needed to lightweight verify a program is at least O(1) and at most O(#P + Lc).

THE CERTIFICATE AND BACKWARD EDGE STRUCTURES
To perform lightweight bytecode verification of a data flow graph by one single traversal of each node, we have to include the flow graph's backward-directed label set Lc in the certificate. Furthermore, we cannot predict when a backwarddirected label will not be further targeted during the analysis; consequently we cannot "garbage collect" the constraint structure S until verification has ended. Two kinds of changes to the certificate would overcome this problem:
-The certificate could be constructed with a reference counter for each label, -We could allow one additional pass of the flow graph before lightweight verification, in order to record the label set Lc and the number of references to each of these.
The first suggestion would in most cases only increase the certificate insignificantly (depending on the number of backward edges to the same nodes). The second suggestion, however, forces the labels and references to be stored in flash ram. For the same reason as before, this would in most cases mean an insignificant increase in space.
With the introduction of reference counts, we could replace Lc in (14) with #S.
OPTIMIZATION OF THE CERTIFICATE
In the preceding paragraph, we discussed the effect of changing or adding other information to the certificate. The original lightweight certificate design, as it was originally presented for Java bytecode by the author (Rose, 1997) , proposes a certificate that by itself embeds the program state component sc, which must contain a solution, that is, an entry function, to the program's data flow constraint set exits. The certification approach totally eliminates the need for S and P to build up in the scratch memory and requires only a single program state allocation. Even though a certificate can be placed in "slow" memory (such as flash or EEPROM), this design significantly increases the size of the certificate to proportional to the number of backward edges in the flow graph. In Section 4.1 we shall comment further on this in the case of Java bytecode.
Java Lightweight Bytecode Verification
The purpose of the section is to specify how the lightweight verification concept applies to Java bytecode for an important JVM subset.
THE BYTECODE STATES
Java bytecode verification is concerned with type-based data flow analysis. In the present research we support a type set that is closely related to the JavaCard set of Java value types (Sun, 1999b) In Java, type safety (and thus type confusion) is closely related to the correspondance between the Java subtype concept and the class inheritance principle, sometimes referred to as the inheritance-is-subtyping property. The correspondence is formalized by the subtype relation ≤: (Abadi and Cardelli, 1996) with the following meaning: The resulting class hierarchy is the outcome of a subtle interaction between class resolution, class loading, and bytecode verification (Lindholm and Yellin, 1999, §5.3-5.4) . It is the class resolver that actually constructs the class hierarchy by allocating the necessary space on the object heap during method execution, whereas the class loader takes care of fetching the referenced class files. Bytecode verification performs in between, since the Java runtime system requires that a method be verified before it can be run. Class resolution and class loading happen in between the method bytecode verification and are not encompassed by the verifier (Jensen et al., 1998) . We can therefore assume that the subclass type context does not change while a method is being verified. For the lightweight bytecode analysis to work, we have added four abstract type values: ⊥ and , Null, and ⊥[] to the set of Java value types.
DEFINITION 16 (Abstract Java types). The abstract Java type sort Type is inductively specified.
The order on the abstract type set is specified by the assignment compatibility relation between Java types (Lindholm and Yellin, 1999, §2.6.7) . The relation describes when it is "safe" to assign a value of a given type to a variable of a given type. In other words, a (type) guarantee for when a method call will be prevented from failing at execution time. The assignment compatibility rules defines an ordering on the abstract type set.
DEFINITION 17 (Assignment compatibility ordering). The type compatibility ordering is defined over the type set Type by the following statements.
-For any type t ∈ Type: t and ⊥ t. -For any two (nonarray) types t 1 , t 2 ∈ Type:
-For any two classes cid 1 , cid 2 ∈ ClassIdent: cid 1 ≤: cid 2 implies cid 2 cid 1 (or contains the reverse pointwise extension of ≤:). -For any class cid ∈ ClassIdent: cid Null.
In Figure 6 , we have illustrated the assignment compatibility ordering for which " ch" represents a given "reversed class hierarchy." Specifically, we have defined the meaning of ⊥ to signify "no value" and to signify "all values." We notice that this interpretation is somewhat opposite that of mainstream conventions. The chosen meanings are based on the observation that subtypes correspond to subclasses and that a subclass is richer in structure (more methods and fields may be defined) than its superclass (and vice versa).
We recall that the content and ordering of a class hierarchy are fixed during verification. Definition 16 is in reality specifying a family of type orderings (Type, ) ch and indexed by (fixed) class hierarchies ch. To simplify the presentation, however, we shall omit the index whenever it is clear from the context. For every given class hierarchy we obtain the following property for the corresponding type set Type.
OBSERVATION 18. The ordered set Type, is a finite lattice.
Before we proceed, we shall briefly comment on some of the omitted types. Remark 19 (Omitted types).
-Other primitive types such as float types, long float types, or long integers, can be added to the compatibility lattice in the same manner as int. -Multidimensional arrays can be added to the compatibility lattice in the same manner as one-dimensional arrays without violating the finiteness of the lattice, because the array dimension in Java is limited at the JVM level (by two bytes).
To ensure that no method that may not be defined can be invoked at execution time, we statically have to verify the states of associated Java frames. Because only the operand stack and local variable table may contain Java program values, we shall omit a type description of other frame elements than the operand stack and the local variable table. The type description of this pair constitute our set of lightweight bytecode verification states, the FrameType set.
DEFINITION 20 (Frame types). A Frame type is specified by a type description of an operand stack (of a given maximal lenght ms) and a local variable table (of a given maximal lenght ml).
Type n lt ∈ LocalType = Type ml ms ∈ MaxStack = 0..65535 ml ∈ MaxLocals = 1..255
We define (FrameType, ) as the pointwise extension of (Type, ) onto FrameType. We have added with the meaning "all frame type values."
We shall briefly comment on the formalization choices we have made for FrameType.
-Frame types are overly general in that they can describe states that are not possible, for example, uninitialized values on the stack. These abstract (frame) types have been included for the sake of completentess. -Notice that we do not permit two frame types to be comparable if they have different stack lengths. The decision follows the official Java specification guidelines (Lindholm and Yellin, 1999, p. 144) . As argued in (Rose, 2002, p. 61) , the decision may at first glance seem unnecessary but makes sense from the perspective that it might introduce a potential violation of ms, unless we keep track of the stack lengths for all compared frame types.
Three things are fixed during bytecode verification: the verified method, the class file where it is specified, and the class (or subtype) context given by ch. We have that the (maximal) stack size ms and local variable table size ml for the method are fixed. As a consequence we have that a frame type ordering is a family of type descriptions (FrameType, ) ms,ml,ch that are indexed the (maximal) frame dimensions and the (fixed) class hierarchy. To simplify the presentation, however, we shall omit the index whenever it is clear from the context.
We observe that the frame type set FrameType is defined as a finite composition of (abstract) types in Type. Because Type is finite for any (fixed) class hierarchy, FrameType is a finite set.
These observations lead to the following statement.
PROPOSITION 21. The ordered set FrameType, is a finite lattice.
THE BYTECODE LABEL SET AND ELEMENTARY BLOCKS
In our formalization we shall let an elementary block be a virtual machine instruction (Lindholm and Yellin, 1999, §6) . The label set Lab thereby becomes represented by the bytecode program points.
DEFINITION 22 (Bytecode label set and blocks)
.
Remark 23. The set of program points are naturally limited by the maximal number that can be stored in a two-byte field in the class file. The number −1, however, is added to formalize the initial frame type constraint.
We consider an instruction set that is sufficiently detailed to facilitate the compilation of a nontrivial subset of Java. These nontrivial features include the ability to -create and manipulate objects, -perform object instance method calls, and -allow access to object instance fields.
Furthermore, we want to be able to program with loops, control flow branching, and recursion, as well as exceptions. The subset is in fact close to the Java Card subset (Sun, 1999b) , with one significant omission: jump subroutines.
Jump subroutines can be mechanically "unfolded" in a separate code transformation pass prior to code transmittance. Even though code unfolding may seem harder than verifying the subroutines directly on the original code, it should be compared with the strain of introducing polymorphic types into the formal frame work, as described in (Stata and Abadi, 1998) . Specifically when we take into consideration that subroutines have been shown to have barely any practical use in reality (Freund, 1998) . (jsr is primarily used to compile final statements of exception handlers.) For these reasons, unfolding of subroutines is in fact already common, commercial practice for Sun's preverifier as described in Sun (2000) .
The instruction set is specified as follows.
DEFINITION 24 (Instructions).
with the auxiliary sorts In Table II we have specified the exit function for each of the instructions in the instruction set. Each function is specified as a frame type transformer τ , which for each instruction is defined according to the Java instruction semantics (Lindholm and Yellin, 1999, §6) . The columns are specified as follows (listed from left to right):
"code(pp)": specifies the instruction at program point pp in the method given by code, "ft": specifies the frame type as expected by the instruction semantics. In other words, an input frame type must match ft by equality up to instantiation of the free variables of ft. "exits(pp)": specifies the set of data flow edges from the instruction at pp, where E(pp) specifies the flow edges created by the exception set that can be thrown at pp.
We specify the initial frame type constraint on program point 0 as a virtual edge, given by exits(−1). Recall that the initial constraint is specified by an empty stack, the self-reference type at the local variable location 0, and a list of the actual method parameter types at local variable location 1 and on.
DEFINITION 25 (Initial flow constraint). Let cid be the type of the method's self reference, and ml the constraint on the local variable table size. Finally, let t 1 . . . t k denote the static types of the method parameters.
We have that τ −1 is a constant function over ProgramPoint.
Notice that we could have formalized the last instruction state as a virtual edge, for e.g., for the return instruction (which has no semantically well-defined resulting state). Instead, we have chosen to restrict the definition of the state transformer τ for return and similar (non-fall-through) instructions.
EXCEPTION VERIFICATION
We have formalized exception verification in the following manner: If an exception can be thrown from a program point pp that is within an exception handler's tryrange, then a flow edge is created to that handler.
DEFINITION 26 (Exception handling).
E(pp)
The formalized approach to exception verification is rather conservative, because it also includes exceptions that, by a more detailed analysis, could be excluded from being processed by the associated handler. In Rose (2002) we have formalized a more precise analysis of how type safety can be verified for exceptions.
Finally, we can specify the constraint set function exits for any method given by code.
DEFINITION 27 (exits function).
where τ −1 is specified in Definition 25 and exits in Table II The proof now follows from Theorem 13 with the following changes:
-entry is replaced by fta, -sc, Lc is replaced by ftc, ls , and -is replaced by pp. ✷
We notice that if a "false" certificate is transmitted (e.g., altered during an untrusted network transfer) or if the code is has been changed so that it doesn't match the certificate any longer, then the code will be rejected by the lightweight bytecode verifier, even if the code is type safe.
COROLLARY 29 (Tamper-proof). The lightweight bytecode verification technique is "tamper-proof."
Finally, we shall comment on the way the memory is used by the algorithm. In Section 2.3 we described the memory requirements in the general lightweight bytecode verification case. In the specific case of Java bytecode, all of the previous considerations hold for the following changes:
-the "Lc" becomes ls -the number of "state descriptors" becomes the number of Java "type descriptors" -the "max state" dimension is given by ms and ml.
The number of stored Java types is given as follows:
where ls is the number of backward labels, and #P is the maximal number of simultaneously active forward edges along the code traversal. (For a more detailed explanation we refer to Section 2.3.)
Related Work
In this section we report on work that is directly related to lightweight verification. In Section 4.1 we explain how Sun's lightweight bytecode verification variant, as implemented in the KVM, can be simulated by the present framework. In Section 4.2 we show how lightweight bytecode verification is a generalization of Leroy's proposed "on-card" bytecode verifier for Java Cards. Finally, in Section 4.3, we relate to the automated series of proofs of the lightweight bytecode verification technique that has been implemented by Klein and Nipkow. In general there is a rich literature on general formalizations of the JVM and the bytecode verifier (Barthe et al., 2000; Drossopoulou et al., 1999; Freund and Mitchell, 1999; Hartel and Moreau, 2001; Stärk et al., 2001 ).
THE K-VIRTUAL MACHINE
Sun's principal implementation of the J2ME virtual machine is the "K-virtual machine," or KVM (Sun, 2000) . The KVM verifier implements our original lightweight approach to type safety (Liang, 1999; Rose and Rose, 1998) as initially proposed by the author (Rose, 1997) . It uses what is called the "StackMap attribute" to implement a "naive" certificate that contains a frame type component for every jump target except the trivial "following instruction" ones. This violates the restriction that the certificate is specified only when ftc(pp) ❁ (S(pp) P (pp)), which, in turn, -makes S (and thus ls) obsolete because every "saved" type descriptor is already available in the certificate, and -reduces P to contain only edges from an instruction to the immediately following instruction of which at most one is active at any time.
So the KVM is optimized to use only a single frame type descriptor variable at run time at the cost of the certificate containing the full frame type descriptor for every jump target. KVM's certificates are consequently rather large: Leroy (2001) reports that the certificate of a method is up to half the size of the method code it certifies.
THE "ON-CARD" BYTECODE VERIFIER
Leroy's "on-card" bytecode verifier (Leroy, 2002) , which is targeted for Java Cards, works by imposing a series of preconditions on the code, obtained by code transformation, to introduce special type invariants prior to the type verification analysis:
-all local variables are initialized (by the modified virtual machine) at method entry, -the operand stack is empty at all jump targets, and -the type of each local variable is constant. Consequently, all comparisons of frame types become equality tests with the constant "jump target frame type" , t 0 · · · t n : -S becomes constant where defined so all that we need to test is that if pp ∈ ls, then the frame type at pp must be equal to the jump target frame type. -P becomes constant so all we have to check is that if P (pp) = , then the frame type at pp is the jump target frame type.
For code without subroutines (jsr) we can thus reproduce Leroy's result in the following way:
1. Do Leroy's code transformation. 2. Add code at the start setting all non-parameter local variables to null (unless, as in Leroy's case, the JVM is known to do this). 3. Use the certificate , T .
The presence of the certificate avoids Leroy's fixed point iteration to compute the types of the local variables; however, executing the lightweight algorithm on the above uses more space than Leroy's because the pending and saved structures are still maintained. However, with the following modifications this problem can be avoided, resulting in equivalent space use of the two algorithms:
1. When the algorithm would extend P to P [pp → ft], this is equivalent to testing that pp ∈ T and ft = , t 0 · · · t n . 2. For pp ∈ T the algorithm would -extend S to S[pp → ft] if pp is a backwards jump, and -test P (pp) ft pending if this was a forward jump, which in both cases is equivalent to testing that ft = , t 0 · · · t n The lack of a certificate in the on-card verifier approach imposes the running time penalty of the fixed point iteration to obtain the local variable types; however, the on-card verifier could safely use a certificate like ours to avoid that.
An interesting question is how the code and frame size cost of the on-card algorithm of not allowing reuse of variable locations, for example, for nested local variables, compares to the code size cost incurred by lightweight bytecode verification's code size growth because of the unfolding of jsr instructions as done by Sun's preverifier.
KLEIN AND NIPKOW'S MECHANICALLY VERIFIED PROOFS
Klein and Nipkow have formalized lightweight bytecode verification in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover (Klein and Nipkow, 2001 ). However, the certificate they operate on is also based on a complete entry solution with respect to basic blocks, in accordance with the initial lightweight bytecode verification pro-posal (Rose, 1997) as also implemented in the KVM; cf. Section 4.1. Also, they do not address exceptions.
When the certificate specifies frame types of all jump targets, then the space bound collapses to a constant, as for the KVM, which is indeed what the authors find from analyzing the formalization as an algorithm (in a high-level functional language).
However, the main goal of Klein and Nipkow is to mechanically prove type safety, and their result, verified with Isabelle/HOL, is similar to Theorem 28. Furthermore, since the Isabelle/HOL formalization is executable, they have achieved an executable lightweight bytecode verifier.
In (Klein, 2003) it is documented how both exceptions and object initialization can be mechanically proven type safe.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have formally defined lightweight bytecode verification by taking a PCC approach to constraint-based data flow analysis. An approach that we have exploited is to stage Java bytecode verification to perform safely over an untrusted network, on a small platform, in only one straight code pass for an important Java subset.
Lightweight bytecode verification has resulted in important industrial applications: the off-device pre-verifier, the in-device verifier, and the certificate StackMap in the CLDC specification, implemented by the Sun (KVM) and by the company GEMPLUS (for smart cards).
The technique has here been formally proven to be "tamper proof" in the sense that no clever conversion of a certificate can make a program's unsolvable constraint set suddenly appear as solvable. For Java bytecode, the notion of being tamper proof is translated into a formal proof that states that conversion of a lightweight bytecode certificate cannot result in type-unsafe bytecode to pass the lightweight verifier.
Finally, we have obtained a unified description of KVM, Leroy's "Java on-card verifier" and general lightweight bytecode verification as described in this paper. In particular we have found that with a naive certificate (frame types for every jump target), the type safety verification in all three cases requires exactly one frame type of scratch RAM.
Future Directions As "run-once" mobile code becomes a more and more elaborate on all the Java platforms, the cost of bytecode verification is becoming noticeable even on standard systems, so Bracha (2000) proposed to develop the KVM verifier for the standard Java platform. We plan to work with the Java community to make this happen.
One of the most interesting future projects in relation to bytecode safety is to investigate how to replace existing runtime checks by static checks through an en-richment of the Java type system. One first attempt has been an investigation of how to represent field protection information by the type system (Rose and Rose, 2001) ; however, more options should be investigated.
